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ABSTRACT
In 2001, the United States Supreme Court held that seeds were pat-
entable subject matter-a decision, I assert, of much discussion and little
impact.' Protection of agricultural intellectual property through private or-
dering, used both to expand the protection available through public ordering
and to circumvent the restrictions public ordering places on owners of intel-
lectual property, has provided the incentives necessary to promote invest-
ment and innovation in seeds. It has not been the patentability of seeds that
has led to agricultural advances, but rather the profitability of licensing ag-
ricultural intellectual property. What if seeds were not patentable? So what
if they are. Innovation in seed has been neither promoted nor incentivized
by the extension of patent protection, but rather by private ordering and free
markets.
INTRODUCTION
Arguably, no country in the world has as expansive a protection
scheme for agricultural biotechnology as the United States.2 Under the pub-
lic ordering system, an agricultural innovator can apply for a Plant Variety
Protection certificate from the Department of Agriculture, a Plant Patent
from the United States Patent and Trademark Office (Patent Office) and a
utility patent also from the Patent Office. Each of these forms of protection
has its strengths and weaknesses. Private ordering allows the agricultural
innovator to overcome these limitations.
1. J.E.M. Ag Supply Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 127 (2001)
("We hold that utility patents may be issued for plants.").
2. Edmund J. Sease & Robert A. Hodgson, Plants are Properly Patentable Under
Prevailing U.S. Law and This is Good Public Policy, 11 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 327, 329 (2006)
("As far as we are aware, no other country offers as expansive protection for plants as the
United States.").
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Agricultural innovation has proven profitable, and protection of this
economic interest has found its basis in private ordering-revolutionizing
the way seed is distributed. No longer is seed sold. Instead, seed is licensed
and protected through an extensive private ordering system that does not
rely on the Patent Act. Agricultural innovators, be they patentees or not,
may choose to not license their goods-but they may not choose to do so in
an anticompetitive manner. The protection of a patent is not sufficient to
protect agricultural innovators if their behavior deprives the farmers of their
right to a free market.
Private ordering has allowed agricultural innovators to control the
market, to affect seed prices, and to develop new varieties, without having
to patent their seed. When the United States Supreme Court decided in
J.E.M Ag Supply Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. in 2001 that
seeds were patentable subject matter,3 its decision was one of much fanfare
and little impact.4 The revolution in agricultural innovation was impacted
by the patentability of seed, but had already occurred at the initiative of the
innovators themselves and through their novel use of private ordering.
I. PROTECTION OF SEED UNDER PUBLIC LAW
Agricultural intellectual property has long been the subject of an ex-
pansive protection scheme in the United States.' Recognizing the impor-
tance of innovation and the role that public ordering plays, Congress has
passed a variety of protective measures for plants, each conflicted, contro-
versial, and limited in scope. A brief history of public protection of plants
illustrates this point.
A. Plant Patent Act
In 1930, Congress enacted the Plant Patent Act (PPA) that protected
"asexually reproducing plants."6 Sexually reproducing plants, such as those
grown from seed,7 were not protected by the PPA.8 This is the fundamental
3. 534 U.S. at 142.
4. See, e.g., Steve Raabe, Farmers Fear Cost of Ruling: Court Restricts the Saving
of Patented Seeds, DENVER POST, Dec. 14, 2001, at C1; Seed Companies Given Protection
for Patents/Farmers Expect Ruling to Raise Planting Costs, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 11,
2001, at 2; Michael T. Roberts, National AgLaw Center Research Article, J.E.M. Ag Supply,
Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.: Its Meaning and Significance for the Agricultural
Community, 28 S. ILL. U. L.J. 91, 128 (2003).
5. Sease & Hodgson, supra note 2, at 329.
6. "Asexual reproduction occurs by grafting, budding, or the like, and produces an
offspring with a genetic combination identical to that of the single parent--essentially a
clone." J.E.M. Ag Supply Inc., 534 U.S. at 132.
7. "Sexual reproduction includes any production of a variety by seed but does not
include the production of a variety by tuber propagation." Jorge Fernandez-Comejo, USDA,
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weakness of the PPA, since "' [c]opying' . . . is the definition of agricul-
ture."9 When the primary purpose of a sexually reproducing plant is to self-
reproduce, it is difficult to justify the expense of innovation. Even absent
statutory protection, an asexually reproducing plant does not self-replicate,
thus generating an innate form of protection and incentive for innovation.'0
B. Plant Variety Protection Act
Subsequently in 1970, Congress enacted the Plant Variety Protection
Act (PVPA). The PVPA provides limited protection for sexually repro-
duced plants through Certificates of Protection (PVP certificates)." PVP
certificates are issued by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, not by the
Patent Office. To protect a plant variety under the PVPA, the plant variety
must be new, distinct, uniform, stable, and sexually reproducible, and the
breeder must describe the variety. 2 This protection is further limited by two
key exemptions: the research exemption and the saved seed exemption. 3
Under the research exemption, seed protected by a PVP certificate
may be used by competitors, without infringing the rights of the certificate
holder, to breed new varieties of seed and for any "bona fide" experimental
The Seed Industry in US. Agriculture: An Exploration of Data and Information on Crop
Seed Markets, Regulation, Industry Structure, and Research and Development, AGRIC. INFO.
BULL. No. 786, at 3 (Jan. 2004).
8. 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (2000).
9. Jim Chen, The Parable of the Seeds: Interpreting the Plant Variety Protection
Act in Furtherance of Innovation Policy, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 105, 110 (2000) ("At least
in the case of self-pollinating plants, seeds reproduce of their own accord. 'Copying,' often a
deviant and difficult deed for would-be infringers in many other industries, is the definition
of agriculture.").
10. See generally Nathan A. Busch, Jack and the Beanstalk: Property Rights in
Genetically Modified Plants, 3 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REv. 1 (2002).
11. Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 181 (1995) ("Congress passed
the [PVPA] . . .in order to provide developers of novel plant varieties with 'adequate en-
couragement for research, and for marketing when appropriate, to yield for the public the
benefits of new varieties' .... The PVPA extends patent like protection to novel varieties of
sexually reproduced plants (that is, plants grown from seed) which parallels the protection
afforded asexually reproduced plant varieties (that is, varieties reproduced by propagation or
grafting) under Chapter 15 of the Patent Act.").
12. 7 U.S.C. § 2422 (2000).
13. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 140 (2001);
see also William Lesser, The Impacts of Seed Patents, 9 N. CENT. J. AGRIc. ECoN. 37, 40
(1987) ("Under the PVPA research exemption, a protected seed variety may be used by a
competing company in a breeding program. For example, if a protected flower variety has
red and white flowers, a competitor, using purchased seed could select for a strain which
produces only white flowers and receive a Certificate for that new variety .... The [saved
seed] exemption ... allows farmers to retain seed for planting and even for sale, provided the
variety name is not used.").
[Vol. 2008:321
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purpose. 4 This exemption allows competitors to test their herbicide on a
protected variety, compare traits of different seeds under varying circum-
stances, and even "'use it in a breeding program to develop new commercial
varieties,' at least as long as such new varieties are different enough not to
be 'essentially derived' from the original protected variety."' 5
The second of these exemptions, the saved seed exemption, allows any
farmer who "legally purchases and plants a protected variety [to] save the
seed from these plants for replanting on his own farm."' 6  Farmers have
been saving seed for as long as farmers have been planting seed, and this
exemption recognizes that practice. 7 However, every seed saved and re-
planted represents a lost sale-thus the power of this exemption. 8
14. "The use and reproduction of a protected variety for plant breeding or other bona
fide research shall not constitute an infringement of the protection provided under this chap-
ter." 7 U.S.C. § 2544.
15. Chen, supra note 9, at 110, 132. Please see this article for a further discussion of
both the saved seed and the research exemption to the PVPA.
16. J.E.M Ag Supply Inc., 534 U.S. at 140.
[I]t shall not infringe any right hereunder for a person to save seed produced by the
person from seed obtained, or descended from seed obtained, by authority of the
owner of the variety for seeding purposes and use such saved seed in the produc-
tion of a crop for use on the farm of the person, or for sale as provided in this sec-
tion. A bona fide sale for other than reproductive purposes, made in channels usual
for such other purposes, of seed produced on a farm either from seed obtained by
authority of the owner for seeding purposes or from seed produced by descent on
such farm from seed obtained by authority of the owner for seeding purposes shall
not constitute an infringement.
7 U.S.C. § 2543 (2000).
This limitation is not well-liked by the seed companies, and some have tried to
extend the protection of the PVPA through marketing. At the time this Article was written,
one seed company had posted the following misinformation on its website:
Patented seed or seed containing patented genes (such as the Roundup Ready®
gene) cannot be saved for replanting. All AG+ Seeds Co. soybean varieties are
patented varieties and cannot be saved for seed for the following year under protec-
tion of the Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA). Saving patented soybean seed or
seed containing patented genes or technologies is a violation of these patents and is
illegal. Seed piracy hinders the development of future technologies and their bene-
fits to the seed industry.
http://www.agplusseeds.com/roundup.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2007).
17. Michael Mascarenhas & Lawrence Busch, Seeds of Change: Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights, Genetically Modified Soybeans and Seed Saving in the United States, 46 EuR.
SOC'Y FOR RURAL SOC. 122 (2006) ("[A]s long as agriculture has existed, farmers have as-
sumed the universal right to save, replant, and exchange seed from their harvests.").
18. This is a tremendous weakness, since "a 'single bushel of soybean seed will
produce between 25 and 45 bushels of soybeans' and ... a 'single soybean seed, after three
crops, will produce 27,000 seeds."' Chen, supra note 9, at 129 (quoting Asgrow Seed Co. v.
Winterboer, 982 F.2d 478, 480 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Newman, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc)).
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C. Utility Patent Protection for Plants
With all of the above-described limitations, the PVPA failed to have
the intended impact on development of new plant varieties. 9 As a result,
agricultural innovators pushed for stronger intellectual property protection
for seed-seeking utility patent protection for plants. 2' A utility patent is
harder to obtain than a PVP Certificate, and, correspondingly, a utility pat-
ent provides more protection than a PVP Certificate-there are no equiva-
lent limitations to 35 U.S.C. § 101,21 the basis for utility patent protection.
Patent protection is available for any "new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter"22 that does not "fall within an ex-
ception to patentability, such as an abstract idea, natural phenomena, or law
of nature.' '23 However, it was not until 1985 that a seed or plant variety was
eligible for utility patent protection under the Patent Act.24 Before this date,
seeds were viewed as natural phenomena not made by man and, therefore,
not eligible for patent protection.25
In 1985, the Patent Office issued a decision in Exparte Hibberd, hold-
ing plants patentable as a "'manufacture' and 'composition of matter."' 26 In
order to obtain a utility patent, the plant variety must be novel, non-obvious,
useful, and described "with sufficient specificity to enable others to 'make
19. Tirtha Dhar & Jeremy Foltz, The Impact of Intellectual Property Rights in the
Plant and Seed Industry, in AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
SEEDS OF CHANGE 161 (Jay P. Kesan ed., 2007) ("Most studies of the effects of the PVPA
S.. have concluded that the introduction of this type of [intellectual property right] did not
induce a significant increase in the amount of research conducted by the industry."). But see
Sease & Hodgson, supra note 2, at 330 ("Even the modest protection afforded by the PVPA
and the PPA has, however, likely had a positive effect on the development of new plant
innovations and varieties. For example, in the decade after the PVPA was enacted, three
times as many wheat and soybean and six times as many cotton varieties were developed
than in the decades prior to the Act's passage.").
20. Up to the late twentieth century, it was generally understood that with a few
carefully drawn exceptions (such as asexually propagating plants under the Plant Patent Act
of 1930 or certain sexually reproduced plants under the Plant Variety Protection Act of
1970), plants and other living organisms were naturally occurring, and as such, unpatentable.
Keith Aoki, Weeds, Seeds & Deeds: Recent Skirmishes in the Seed Wars, 11 CARDOZO J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 247, 279 (2003).
21. "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufac-
ture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent thereof, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C. § 101
(2000). In contrast, a PVP Certificate requires neither a showing of usefulness or nonobvi-
ousness. 7 U.S.C § 2402 (2000).
22. 35U.S.C. § 101.
23. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
24. Exparte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443,444 (1985).
25. Aoki, supra note 20, at 279.
26. 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 444.
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and use' the invention. 2 7 This decision was upheld by the United States
Supreme Court in 2001.28 Sixteen years after Hibberd, the Court held "that
utility patents may be issued for plants." 9
II. PROTECTION OF SEED UNDER PRIVATE LAW
One of the underlying tenets of patent law is that innovation requires
protection and that absent protection, innovators will lose their edge to imi-
tators."a Public laws have historically been limited in their protection of
agricultural innovation; imitation is the very definition of agriculture,3 and
yet innovation has occurred.32 It was not until 2001 that the United States
Supreme Court recognized the patentability of seed. Despite this, yields
have increased, filings for protection of plants through the Patent Office and
the Department of Agriculture are up, and applications for field-testing of
new plant varieties have increased an astonishing 13,300% from 1987 until
1998. " During this time, there was no change in the publicly ordered pro-
tection scheme. Instead, the incentive for innovation arose from a revolu-
tion in the way seed was distributed.34 Given the limitations inherent in any
form of public protection for agricultural innovation, seed companies turned
to private ordering to protect their research and development.35 No longer is
seed sold; now it is licensed, and with these licenses, the seed market has
fundamentally changed.
27. 35 U.S.C. § 101; J.E.M. Ag Supply Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S.
124, 142 (2001).
28. Roberts, supra note 4.
29. J.E.M Ag Supply Inc., 534 U.S. at 127.
30. Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, Perfectly Competitive Innovation (CEPR
Discussion Paper No. 3274, 2002), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-308040 ("[W]hat
would happen to innovations in the absence of legal monopoly protection? Conventional
wisdom suggests that.., competition must necessarily fail to produce innovations.").
31. Chen, supra note 9, at 110.
32. "Limiting the scope of [35 U.S.C.] Section 101 to exclude sexually reproduced
plants-thus denying that broader protection-would ... reduce incentives for research and
development in the agricultural and horticultural arts." Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 11, J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred
Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2000/-
2pet/6invit/1999-1996.pet.ami.inv.html.
33. Femandez-Comejo, supra note 7, at viii.
34. DANIEL CHARLES, LORDS OF THE HARVEST: BIOTECH, BIG MONEY, AND THE
FUTURE OF FOOD 308 (2001) (agricultural innovators realized that the "seed business had to
become a real business with real control over its products [to capture] the value that [the
innovators] felt was rightfully theirs").
35. Marvin L. Hayenga, Structural Change in the Biotech Seed And Chemical In-
dustrial Complex, 1 J. AGROBIOTECH. MGMT. ECON. 43 (1998).
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A. Protection of the Development Process
In order to understand the impact of private ordering on agriculture, it
is helpful to explore the structure of the agrarian economy.36 A typical
farmer, Farmer Joan, wants to plant her field with seed that will give her the
highest yield for the least work.3 7 Farmers purchase seed based on its de-
scription, the recommendation of the distributor, and its reputation.38
Farmer Joan seeks seed bred for the growing conditions peculiar to her
fields. She may want drought-resistant seed or seed that thrives in damp
weather, depending on what her almanac says the weather will be like dur-
ing the growing season, and depending on what she has found worked for
her before. She wants a high yield seed that will survive her local weeds
and thrive in her climate.
Development of such seed is an art. An agricultural innovator starts
with one of a set of carefully guarded seed lines that are maintained as trade
secrets by seed companies and that represent the companies' reputation and
capital.39 The variety may be protected by a PVP certificate, but more im-
portantly, it is protected by its own reputation. In order to maintain that
reputation, the variety is modified on an annual and regional basis.4" Differ-
ent seed is sold in different parts of the country. Seed that has proven par-
ticularly resistant to kudzu might be sold in Mississippi, while seed that is
36. Femandez-Comejo, supra note 7, at 28 ("Plant breeding constitutes the founda-
tion of the modem seed industry in that it creates a unique and marketable product through
the application of science .... A seed's success in the market depends primarily on [the
research and development] its improved traits, which embody the R&D effort.").
37. Tom Philpott, Dominant Traits: Monsanto's Latest Court Triumph Cloaks Mas-
sive Market Power, GRIST: ENVTL. NEWS & COMMENT., Jan. 17, 2008, http://www.grist.org/-
comments/food/2008/01/17/ ("You have to understand how large-scale commodity farmers
make decisions. Your neighbor tries a new product, and suddenly boasts weed-free fields
and yields that trump yours. He reveals that he bought newfangled, high-dollar seeds-and
more than made his money back with the higher yield. So you do the same.").
38. Personal conversation with Homan McFarling, Jan. 2005 (Homan McFarling is a
Mississippi farmer who saved seed that he licensed from Monsanto. He became involved in
a lengthy suit with Monsanto as discussed by Philpott, supra note 37).
39. Mark D. Janis, Supplemental Forms of Intellectual Property Protection for
Plants, 6 MINN. J. L. Sci. & TECH. 307, 310 (2004) ("Trade secret protection has long been
used in the seed industry.... [One example of] trade secret protection that is considered to
be typical in the seed industry: trade secrets in the identity and genetics of the inbred parents
of a commercially-distributed hybrid."); JACK RALPH KLOPPENBURG, JR., FIRST THE SEED:
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY 1492-2000, at 11 (2d ed. 2004) ("[T]he
peculiarities of breeding hybrid com mean that the parent lines of any particular variety can
be developed and maintained as trade secrets, thus making hybrid seed a proprietary prod-
uct.").
40. Femandez-Comejo, supra note 7, at vii ("Improved plant varieties are a product
of research and development. Seeds embody the scientific knowledge needed to produce a
new plant variety with desirable attributes, such as higher yield potential, greater disease
resistance, or improved quality.").
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particularly resistant to chickweed might be sold in North Dakota.4 These
modifications are recalculated every year based on market research, chang-
ing innovations in the company and industry, and predictions about the next
year's crop conditions.42
There is no discussion of patents in the development process, and, in-
deed, whether a seed is patented or not makes little difference to a farmer.43
The farmer instead wants to know that the seed will produce a high yield;
that the developer understands the conditions that the seed will be grown
under; that the work of the farmer will be minimized because the seed will
resist the local weeds; and that the seed will thrive under the local weather
and soil conditions." A patent does not provide the farmer with this infor-
mation. First and foremost, therefore, seed companies wish to protect their
seed lines. They do so through private ordering.
B. Changing the Landscape
The agricultural industry is a highly concentrated field with the major-
ity of the economy controlled by three companies." Focusing in on the
behavior of one such player, Monsanto, and one seed, Roundup Ready soy-
bean seed,46 provides a window into the revolution in the seed industry that
41. See generally Paul W. Unger & Merle F. Vigil, Cover Crop Effects on Soil Wa-
ter Relationships, J. SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION 200 (May 1, 1998); see also Blades v.
Monsanto Co., 400 F.3d 562 (8th Cir. 2005) ("[G]enetically modified seeds are not homoge-
nous products. The market for seeds is highly individualized depending upon geographic
location, growing conditions, consumer preference and other factors.").
42. Fernandez-Comejo, supra note 7, at 28 ("The production of certified seed re-
quires strategic planning to ensure that market demand is adequately met. This planning may
include determining the quantities of each variety to be produced; determining inventories
necessary to produce in excess of forecasted demand to avoid immediate or future shortages;
and reducing the risks associated with the unpredictable effects of weather conditions, dis-
ease, and pests.").
43. Roberts, supra note 4, at 125 ("Until ... the PTO reversed its stance on the
issuance of utility patents for sexually reproducing plants, seed companies typically em-
ployed trade secrets to protect the parental line. Trade secret protection still serves as a valu-
able tool in protecting the interest of seed producers.").
44. Femandez-Cornejo, supra note 7, at 28 ("Plant breeders develop seeds embody-
ing such improvements as high yields, resistance to disease and pests, or traits specific to
regional agroclimatic conditions. A seed's success in the market depends primarily on its
improved traits, which embody the R&D effort.").
45. Andrew Douglas, Biotechnology Delivers New Traits, COUNTRY GUIDE, Dec. 21,
2006 ("The industry is controlled by 3 main players: DuPont (Pioneer Hi-Bred), Syngenta
(NK) and Monsanto (Dekalb). Those three companies develop most of the new traits and
license them to each other, smaller seed companies and public breeding programs.").
46. Iowa Farmer Sues Seed Company: Pioneer Hi-Bred is Accused of Price Fixing,
GRAND FORKS HERALD, Feb. 6, 2006, § FRM, 2006 WLNR 2038555 ("Roundup Ready
soybeans are genetically engineered to withstand the application of an herbicide that kills
soybeans.").
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has been brought about by the innovative use of private ordering to protect
seed. When Monsanto introduced Roundup Ready soybean seed, Monsanto
was looking for a way to break into the inner circle of the industry. It suc-
ceeded-and where Monsanto was once "barely active in the seed indus-
try," now Monsanto controls the soybean market, selling over eighty-seven
percent of all soybean seed planted in the United States in 2005.47 The land-
scape has changed.
In Monsanto's quest to join the inner circle, it realized that cross-
licensing was the key to allowing Monsanto access to seed lines owned by
Monsanto's competitors. Therefore, as Monsanto worked to create a market
for its product, it simultaneously aggressively licensed its technology to
other seed companies.48 Monsanto's marketing worked, and a market was
created, both through cross-licensing and through the farmers' demands.
Monsanto was very restrictive with its licenses and allowed its competitors
to use its technology as long as the competitors agreed to "not sell seed con-
taining Monsanto's technology to growers unless the grower signs one of
Monsanto's license agreements." Furthermore, it required all licensees to
require the growers "to grow only a single commercial crop."49  Cross-
licensing is at the core of Monsanto's revolutionary distribution scheme."
Roundup Ready soybean seed is available from a number of seed compa-
nies-but every variety of Roundup Ready soybean seed distributed is dis-
tributed under license from Monsanto." The Monsanto license contains
numerous restrictions-most importantly the restriction that the seed never
be sold but only licensed-ensuring the fact that control will never leave
Monsanto.
47. Id. ("The Roundup Ready seeds were planted on 87 percent of soybean acreage
in the United States last year.").
48. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("Monsanto
licenses its proprietary ROUNDUP READY® technology through two interrelated licensing
schemes. First, it licenses the patented gene to seed companies that manufacture the gly-
phosate-tolerant seeds that are sold to farmers. Under this license, seed companies gain the
right to insert the genetic trait into the germplasm of their own seeds (which can differ from
seed company to seed company), and Monsanto receives the right to a royalty or 'technology
fee' of $6.50 for every 50-pound bag of seed containing the ROUNDUP READY® technol-
ogy sold by the seed company. Monsanto also owns several subsidiary seed companies that
comprise approximately 20 percent of the market for ROUNDUP READY® soybeans.
Second, Monsanto requires that seed companies execute licenses, rather than conduct uncon-
ditional sales, with their farmer customers.").
49. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Please note
that the seed is not actually sold, despite the language of the decision; rather, the seed is
distributed under a license agreement.
50. See, e.g., MONSANTO, MONSANTO-Dow AGROSCIENCES GLOBAL AGREEMENT
(Jan. 18, 2006), available at http://www.monsanto.com/monsanto/cotent/investor/finan-
cial/presentations/2006/01-18-06.pdf (allowing Dow to create and license finished hybrids
containing Roundup Ready biotechnology).
51. McFarling, 363 F.3d at 1339. For the language of the license, see supra note 48.
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Private ordering and marketing have extended Monsanto's power be-
yond that available to it through public ordering. 2 Farmers buy Roundup
Ready seed because of Monsanto's marketing53 and innovative distribution
practices, not because the seed is better."
C. Protecting the Relationship between Developers and Distributors
After a seed variety has been developed and propagated, it is distrib-
uted through licensed seed distributors. Through marketing and cross-
licensing, Monsanto has come to dominate the market as described above,
allowing Monsanto to pick and choose its seed distributors. This leads to
competition between local seed shops seeking to become licensed seed dis-
tributors for Monsanto.5
By controlling the market in this fashion, Monsanto can place numer-
ous restrictions on its licensed seed distributors, which it does. In order to
distribute Monsanto seed, the licensed seed distributor must sign a lengthy
contract containing numerous restrictions. 6 Chief among these restrictions
is the requirement, once again, that the distributor may never sell the seed
but only license it." Furthermore, the distributor agrees not to license the
seed to any farmer on Monsanto's blacklist. 8
What is the blacklist? Any farmer who is alleged to have used Mon-
santo's seed in a manner not in accord with Monsanto's policies will find
52. Some have argued that Monsanto relied not only on marketing, but also on
"heavy-handed investigations and ruthless prosecutions that have fundamentally changed the
way many American farmers farm." CR. FOR FOOD SAFETY, MONSANTO VS. U.S. FARMERS 4
(2005), http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/pubs/CFSMOnsantovsFarmerReport 1.13.05.pdf.
53. See, e.g., Southeast Farm Press Staff, Monsanto to Guarantee Roundup Ready
System, SOUTHEAST FARM PRESS, Sept. 6, 2000, http://southeastfarmpress.com/mag/farm-
ingmonsantoguarantee roundup/ (One example states that Roundup Ready: "soybeans
grown in narrow rows add $16 per acre more to a grower's bottom line than conventional
soybeans . . . . 'On a 1,000 acre farm, no-till can save as much as 450 hours of time and
3,500 gallons of diesel fuel each year. That's 11, 40-hour weeks in time savings and $4,000
less for diesel at $1.15 per gallon."').
54. Furthermore, Roundup-Ready seed is not necessarily better seed than non-
Roundup Ready seed. David S. Bullock & Elisavet I. Nitsi, Roundup Ready Soybean Tech-
nology and Farm Production Costs, 44 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1283 (2001). It is signifi-
cantly more expensive, and does not produce "as high a yield as conventional crops with
comparable genomic background." Nathan A. Busch, Genetically Modified Plants Are Not
"Inventions " andAre, Therefore, Not Patentable, 10 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 387, 482 (2005).
55. See, e.g., CHARLES, supra note 34, at 177 (One distributor was so concerned that
it "w[as] going to be shut out of the market" that it "banded together with... other small...
seed dealers to form a joint venture .... They hoped that the new company would be sub-
stantial enough to earn them a license for Roundup Ready soybeans.").
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his or her name on a list sent to all licensed distributors of Monsanto's prod-
ucts.59 The distributors agree to not distribute Monsanto's products to the
named farmers. The blacklist bars farmers from purchasing any Monsanto
seed, not just the seed the farmer is alleged to have misused.' The blacklist
does not discriminate between those farmers alleged to have used, and those
proven to have used, Monsanto's seed in a fashion of which Monsanto did
not approve.6 1 Until (and if) Monsanto determines that the farmer has not
breached the license, then Monsanto will blacklist the farmer.62 Farmers
placed on the blacklist may find themselves scrambling to purchase any
seed to plant for the growing season. Monsanto can exercise this level of
control because it has a product that farmers and distributors want, and it
never lets the product out of its control. If a distributor does not follow the
terms of Monsanto's license, the distributor can be sued for breach of con-
tract and may have its license revoked.
D. Protecting the Relationship between Developers and Farmers
At the bottom of the private ordering system is the seed. The funda-
mental purpose of developing new varieties of distributing seed and of li-
censing the seed is the farming of the seed. For this to happen, the farmer
must acquire the seed. Never having let the seed out of their control, com-
panies such as Monsanto are hardly going to send the seed out to the fields
without additional restrictions placed on the relationship with the grower.
First and foremost, a farmer wishing to plant Roundup Ready seed must go
to his or her local distributor, who is a "seed company with technology li-
cense(s) from Monsanto or ... a licensed company's authorized dealer"63
59. CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY, supra note 52, at 29.
60. Letter from Christian Mullgardt, Husch & Eppenberger, LLC (Oct. 19, 2006)
(on file with author) ("Please be advised that until this matter is resolved, Monsanto does not
authorize you or any other individual or entity by, through or with whom you farm to use any
seed containing Monsanto's patented biotechnology.").
61. Id. "Investigators contacted you ... in conjunction with an investigation into
allegations of replanting saved seed, second generation Roundup Ready soybeans." Id. Mon-
santo states that it: "greatly values its customers and recognizes that growers have many seed
variety choices. However, growers who choose to use Monsanto's patented germplasm or
seed, such as Roundup Ready varieties, must adhere to the terms of use that govern the re-
spective patented biotechnology." Id.
62. Monsanto has aired "radio ads... during the fall soybean harvest in which the
company named farmers who had been caught saving seed-ads the company calls 'educa-
tional' and others call 'intimidating."' Rick Weiss, Seeds of Discord; Monsanto's Gene
Police Raise Alarm On Famers 'Rights, Rural Tradition, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1999, at Al.
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and then agree to Monsanto's terms.' By merely opening a bag of Mon-
santo seed, the farmer agrees:
To use the seed containing Monsanto gene technologies for planting a commercial
crop only in a single season.
To not supply any of this seed to any other person or entity for planting, and to not
save any crop produced from this seed for replanting, or supply saved seed to any-
one for replanting.
To not use this seed or provide it to anyone for crop breeding, research, generation
of herbicide registration data or seed production.
65
Despite the fact that the primary purpose of this language appears to
be the circumvention of the PVPA research and saved seed exemptions, this
license has been upheld by at least one court since it is
logically intended to protect [Monsanto's] patent monopoly and to thereby permit
it to capture revenue in the form of future sales of technology. Without the prohi-
bition against the saving of seed for replanting or resale, Monsanto's patent would
soon be rendered useless by virtue of the potential for exponential multiplication of
the seed containing its patented technology. Given the risk of Monsanto's thus los-
ing control of its technology, the limited license of its technology was the only rea-
sonable alternative available to it if it hoped to garner a reasonable return on its
sizeable investment while making the technology available for commercial use at a
reasonable price to consumers.
66
Monsanto has brought over 100 lawsuits based on licenses containing
similar restrictions. Those lawsuits resulted in over $15 million in recorded
judgments for Monsanto. 67 One farmer served jail time for destroying evi-
dence as a result of Monsanto's suit.68
III. A COMPARISON OF THE VARIOUS FORMS OF PROTECTION
Monsanto and other agricultural innovators have sought to protect
their product through public and private ordering and in doing so, have cir-
cumvented and rendered unnecessary the decision of the United States Su-
preme Court in J.E.M It is a useful exercise to see how the private ordering
model works in practice.
64. CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY, supra note 52, at 10 ("While statistics on the availability
of conventional seed are difficult to find, anecdotal evidence seems to suggest that Mon-
santo's varieties of genetically engineered seeds have effectively pushed other seed varieties
off the market.").
65. Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
66. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 249 F. Supp. 2d 746 (N.D. Miss. 2001).
67. Press Release, Ctr. for Food Safety, Monsanto Assault on U.S. Farmers Detailed
in New Report (Jan. 13, 2005), available at http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/-
pressrelease 1.13.05.cfm.
68. Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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A. Scenario One: Farmer Saves Lawfully Acquired Seed
Farmer Joan acquires and plants protected seed. Farmer Joan culti-
vates the protected seed, saves it, and replants it in her field the next year.6 9
1. Plant Variety Protection Act
Under the Plant Variety Protection Act, a farmer is entitled to save
seed as long as the seed is obtained "by authority of the owner of the variety
for seeding purposes."7 If a PVP certificate protected the seed, and Farmer
Joan obtained the protected seed by authority of the owner, then she is not
infringing the PVPA by saving the seed and replanting it in her own field.
This is one of the limitations of the PVPA. If the owner of the protected
variety is relying solely on the PVPA for protection, there is no infringe-
ment here.
2. Contractual Protection
Under private ordering, as well as the PVPA, to protect its seed, then
the owner is protected. By licensing seed, Farmer Joan has agreed not to
save and replant that seed, and in doing so is acting in breach of contract.
Farmer Joan will have now earned herself a spot on the owner's blacklist,
and the local seed distributor will be unable to license to Farmer Joan any
other varieties of seed that have the same owner without breaching the seed
distributor's contract with the variety's owner. The breach may have such a
chilling effect that the local distributor may be unwilling to do business with
Farmer Joan at all for fear of angering the agricultural innovator.
3. Utility Patent Protection
Under the Patent Act, if Farmer Joan was able to clean and replant her
saved seed, she has arguably used the protected seed in violation of the
owner's patent. The seed would reproduce, thus infringing the patent, and
any potential sale of the seed would be a further violation of the patentee's
right to sell the patented seed. The owner could sue Farmer Joan for patent
infringement, but would be unable to prevent her from acquiring the seed
from her local distributor.
69. This example is based on Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
70. 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (2000).
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4. Conclusion
The incentive structure for the agricultural innovator to license seed is
not impacted by the Patent Act. Without relying on utility patent protection,
the owner of the variety can sue Farmer Joan for breach of contract, and can
prevent Farmer Joan from selling her seed, replanting her seed, and acquir-
ing other varieties of seed she owns. In other words, the agricultural inno-
vator has protected its bottom line more efficiently, and by preventing
Farmer Joan from acquiring other varieties, has protected itself in a fashion
stronger than that granted under the Patent Act.
B. Scenario Two: Farmer Saves Seed
Farmer Joan buys and plants unprotected seed. Farmer Joan's
neighbor, Farmer Jane, licenses and plants protected seed. The wind blows
seed from Farmer Jane's field onto Farmer Joan's field. Farmer Joan culti-
vates the protected seed, saves it, and replants it in her field the next year."'
1. Plant Variety Protection Act
Under the Plant Variety Protection Act, a farmer is entitled to save
seed as long as the seed is obtained "by authority of the owner of the variety
.for seeding purposes."72 If Farmer Jane's seed is protected by a PVP Cer-
tificate, then Farmer Joan did not obtain the protected seed by authority of
the owner, and therefore is infringing the PVP Certificate by saving the seed
and replanting it.
2. Contractual Protection
In addition to the infringement of the PVPA, the seed could be pro-
tected under private ordering. By planting seed without permission of the
owner of the variety, and not under a license from the owner, Farmer Joan
will have earned herself a spot on the owner's blacklist, and the local seed
distributor will be unable to license to Farmer Joan any other varieties of
seed that have the same owner without breaching the seed distributor's con-
tract with the variety's owner. A farmer typically plants multiple varieties
of seed every year. The margin on a farm is so low that farmers minimize
their odds and maximize the potential margin by planting numerous varie-
ties-ensuring that some seeds will grow if it is a wet summer, while others
71. This example is based on Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902
(Can.).
72. 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (2000).
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will grow if it is a dry summer.73 So now, Farmer Joan has only the ability
to replant the seed she saved from the previous season. In order to plant
saved seeds, the seed must be cleaned.74 As seen in Scenario Three, the
local ginner is unlikely to clean any seed without authorization from the
variety's owner. Farmer Joan is unable to process and use her saved seed,
and is unable to acquire new varieties from the local seed distributor.
3. Utility Patent Protection
The discussion is the same no matter how Farmer Joan acquires the
seed, so please see the analysis provided in Scenario One.
4. Conclusion
Please see the analysis provided in Scenario One.
73. This is a vastly simplified analysis of the business of farming and is based on a
personal communication with Homan McFarling.
74.
The delinting process is an essential step in preparing cottonseed for planting. Vir-
tually all cotton farmers in the United States utilize delinted cottonseed in planting
their crops.
To process cottonseed, such as a farmer might purchase from Delta, the seed is first
taken to a gin where most of the fiber or lint is separated from the seed. The seed
can then be taken to a delinter, such as Sinkers. The delinting process removes the
remaining lint. Undelinted, but ginned, cottonseed arrives at Sinkers's Kennett fa-
cility in a truck. In some cases, individual farmers bring cottonseed to the facility
in pickup trucks. In other cases, however, large quantities of cottonseed, from
many different distributors, farmers and farming cooperatives, arrive in tractor-
trailer rigs. Upon its arrival at Sinkers's facility, undelinted cottonseed is placed in
a "run bin". The seed is then fed into an auger, where it is wetted with a sulfuric
acid solution. From there, the seed passes through a centrifuge where the solution
is spun off. The seed emerges in a damp-dry condition and is passed through two
dryers and two buffers. In the drying and buffing process, all remaining lint is
separated from the seed. After culls, sticks and debris are removed from the bulk
seed, the seed is treated with chemicals (if the client so requests-this is the "con-
ditioning" stage of the process, the seed having by now been delinted), and then
placed in fifty-pound bags. After the seed has been bagged, it is loaded onto trucks
and transported to its next destination, which may or may not be the place from
which the seed was sent, depending on the instructions given to the delinter.
Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Sinkers Corp., 177 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (footnote
omitted).
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C. Scenario Three: Ginner Cleans Protected Seed
Farmer Joan licenses and plants protected seed. Farmer Joan culti-
vates the protected seed, saves it, and takes it to Ginner George to clean so
she can replant it in her field the next year.75
1. Plant Variety Protection Act
Under the Plant Variety Protection Act, a farmer is entitled to save
seed as long as the seed is obtained "by authority of the owner of the variety
for seeding purposes."76 If a PVP Certificate protected the seed, and Farmer
Joan obtained the protected seed by authority of the owner, she therefore is
not infringing the PVPA by saving the seed and replanting it. This means
that Ginner George can safely clean the seed for her replanting purposes.
This is one of the limitations of the PVPA. If the owner of the protected
variety is relying on the PVPA for protection, it is unprotected here.
2. Contractual Protection
However, if the seed is protected under private ordering, then Farmer
Joan is breaching her contract with the agricultural innovator by seeking to
have the protected seed cleaned. If Ginner George interferes with that con-
tractual relationship, Ginner George may be liable for tortious interference
with contract.77 There is no privity of contract between Ginner George and
the owner of the seed variety. Farmer Joan, however, would be unable to
breach her contract with the owner without Ginner George's assistance.
Ginner George can arguably be found to have interfered in the contractual
relationship between Farmer Joan and the owner of the seed variety. There
are two main qualifiers to this cause of action. The first is that Ginner
George must know of the contract between Farmer Joan and the owner of
the seed variety. In an era where eighty-seven percent of the soybean crop
planted is genetically modified soybean78 and is governed by contract, and
75. The author was unable to find a recorded case where Monsanto sued a seed
cleaner who was not also being sued for replanting saved seed. This example is therefore a
hypothetical one.
76. 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (2000).
77.
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract
.. between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing the third
person not to perform the contract is subject to liability to the other for the pecuni-
ary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the third person to perform the
contract.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1977).
78. Iowa Farmer Sues Seed Company, supra note 46 ("Roundup Ready soybeans
are genetically engineered to withstand the application of an herbicide that kills soybeans.
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when seed distributors admit that they no longer sell seed but only license
it,79 it may be sufficient to prove that Ginner George should have known
that the contract existed." The second qualifier is that Ginner George's
action in cleaning the seed must be improper. There are many factors to be
evaluated in determining whether Ginner George's action is improper-but
if in cleaning the seed Ginner George was motivated by a desire to help
Farmer Joan breach the contract, and there was a direct relationship between
his conduct and the breach, it is at least a colorable argument that his actions
were improper. 1
In addition to the indirect relationship between Ginner George and the
owner of the seed variety, many seed cleaners are themselves either farmers
or seed dealers, or both. As a result, the seed cleaners have direct relation-
ships with agricultural innovators. As part of these contractual relation-
ships, the seed cleaners agree not to clean protected seed.82 In other words,
Farmer Joan is going to have a hard time getting her seed cleaned, since
Ginner George may be liable for doing so.
3. Utility Patent Protection
Under the Patent Act, a ginner who cleans patented seed may be liable
for infringement even though he is not directly infringing the patent him-
self.83 If Ginner George is assisting Farmer Joan in infringing the patent,
The Roundup Ready seeds were planted on 87 percent of soybean acreage in the United
States last year.").
79. On a visit to a distributor in rural Mississippi, the author was informed that that
particular distributor, Jimmy Sanders' Seed Shop in Ecru, Mississippi, did not distribute any
seed without an accompanying Technology Agreement, or other form of license.
80. In Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Sinkers Corp., the Federal Circuit read a require-
ment of scienter into the PVPA and held that scienter meant that the ginner must have known
or should have known of the infringement. It was not required that actual knowledge be
proven. 177 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
81.
In determining whether an actor's conduct in intentionally interfering with a con-
tract or a prospective contractual relation of another is improper or not, considera-
tion is given to the following factors:
(a) the nature of the actor's conduct,
(b) the actor's motive,
(c) the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct interferes,
(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor,
(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the con-
tractual interests of the other,
(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interference and
(g) the relations between the parties.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (1977).
82. CHARLES, supra note 34, at 178.
83. "Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an in-
fringer." 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2000).
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then Ginner George's action may expose him to liability under 35 U.S.C. §
271. By replanting the seed, Farmer Joan may be directly infringing the
patent. She is unable to replant that seed without the assistance of Ginner
George. When Ginner George cleans the seed, and transfers the cleaned
seed back to Farmer Joan, he could be inducing Farmer Joan to infringe the
patent in violation of the rights of the owner of the seed. Ginner George
and Farmer Joan would be "considered jointly and severally liable for the
infringement under a theory ofjoint tortfeasance."84
As in the discussion above for private ordering, it must be shown that
Ginner George knew that Farmer Joan would be infringing the patent. 5
However, "[w]hile proof of intent is necessary, direct evidence is not re-
quired; rather, circumstantial evidence may suffice. The inducer must have
actual or constructive knowledge of the patent."86  Once again, in an era
where over eighty-five percent of the soybean crop planted contains the
patented Roundup-Ready trait, 7 and seed does not have to be cleaned to be
taken to the grain elevator and sold, but does have to be cleaned to be re-
planted,88 to establish an infringement of the patent, it may be sufficient to
prove that Ginner George should have known that Farmer Joan would re-
plant the seed and infringe the patent. In other words, Ginner George's ac-
tivities could provide sufficient circumstantial evidence to find that he was
intentionally inducing Farmer Joan to replant the seed and infringe the pat-
ent. Ginner George would therefore be exposed to liability for cleaning
Farmer Joan's seed, and would thus be very unlikely to provide this service.
4. Conclusion
Ginner George is liable for cleaning protected seed whether the seed is
patented, or protected under a combination of private ordering and the
PVPA. If the seed is patented, Ginner George is jointly and severally liable
for patent infringement. Under the private ordering system, however, if
Ginner George violates the agricultural innovator's rules, Ginner George
84. JANICE M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW 314 (2d ed. 2006).
85. Id
86. Id.
87. Iowa Farmer Sues Seed Company, supra note 46.
88.
Soybeans are like small marbles, brown and hard. They grow in pods hanging
from knee-high bushes. When the leaves turn yellow and drop off, it's time to call
in the combine. This self-propelled machine roars through the field, ingesting the
plants, stripping off the pods, ripping them open, and disgorging the hulls. What's
left are the beans themselves along with bits of hull, plant stems, and bits of dirt.
These soybeans are fine for taking to the grain elevator, but any farmer who
wanted to plant them as seed would want to run them through the seed cleaner.
CHARLES, supra note 34, at 186.
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may find himself on the innovator's blacklist and would be unable to oper-
ate his business. There are strong economic incentives under both systems
of protection for Ginner George to decline to clean protected seed.
D. Scenario Four
Farmer Joan acquires and plants protected seed. Farmer Joan culti-
vates the protected seed, saves it, and replants the seed. Farmer Joan visits
Dealer Dan to buy additional seed for her field.
1. Plant Variety Protection Act
Under the Plant Variety Protection Act, Farmer Joan can save and re-
plant the seed as discussed in Scenario One, and Dealer Dan faces no pen-
alty for licensing her additional seed.
2. Contractual Protection
If, however, Farmer Joan has licensed the protected seed, and is re-
planting the seed in violation of her license, Dealer Dan faces numerous
penalties for licensing her additional seed. As discussed above, in order to
license seed, Dealer Dan must enter into contracts with the agricultural in-
novators. Part of the contract states that Dealer Dan will not license seed to
any farmer who is not approved by the agricultural innovator. Farmer
Joan's activities will quickly land her on the blacklist, and if Dealer Dan
licenses her seed, Dealer Dan is breaching his contract with the agricultural
innovator, and may also be placed on the innovator's blacklist himself.
3. Utility Patent Protection
Farmer Joan may be infringing the patentee's rights by replanting
seed, but Dealer Dan is not violating the patentee's rights in any manner by
licensing Farmer Joan's additional seed. This presumes that Dealer Dan
does not license Farmer Joan's seed for the express purpose of having her
infringe the patent on the seed, but is instead licensing her seed because he
is in the business of distributing seed to farmers.
4. Conclusion
In this Scenario, private ordering provides stronger protection for the
agricultural innovator than the utility patent does. Under the Patent Act,
Dealer Dan is doing no wrong by simply distributing seed to farmers, per
his normal business practices.
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IV. ENFORCING PRIVATE ORDERING AND ANTITRUST RESTRICTIONS
Agricultural innovators need not rely on the Patent Act to protect seed.
Instead, they could choose to rely solely on private ordering and the PVPA
to protect seed as discussed above. Whether agricultural innovators rely on
public or private ordering to protect their seed, what they cannot do is be-
have in an anticompetitive manner. If the agricultural innovator is a pat-
entee, then it is not anticompetitive for the innovator to refuse to license its
patented technology, as the owner has the right to exclude others from using
the patented invention during the term of the patent.89 However, if the pat-
entee is unduly restraining trade, and the patented seed is being used by the
patentee "not only as a shield to protect his invention, but as a sword to
eviscerate competition unfairly ... [then] that owner ... may become liable
for antitrust violations when sufficient power in the relevant market is pre-
sent."'90
In order to show an antitrust violation, it must be proven that the agri-
cultural innovator has market power and that the market power has been
acquired or is being used in an anticompetitive manner.9' Whether an agri-
cultural innovator has patented his or her technology has no impact on the
determination of market power.92 Furthermore, if that market power com-
bined with the effect of the innovator's behavior on the "prices, quantities,
qualities, or varieties of goods and services either currently or potentially
available" 93 is anticompetitive, then hiding behind the shield of a patent will
not help.94
89. See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1328 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (holding that the patent holder "was under no obligation to sell or license its patented
parts and did not violate the antitrust laws by refusing to do so"); 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)
(2000) (It is not anticompetitive to "refuse[] to license or use any rights to the patent."); U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guide-
lines/0558.pdf (A patent gives a patentee the right to exclude others from making, using, or
selling in the United States, the invention claimed by the patent for a period of time.).
90. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
91. See U.S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 861 F.2d 695, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
92. I11. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45-46 (2006) ("Congress,
the antitrust enforcement agencies, and most economists have all reached the conclusion that
a patent does not necessarily confer market power upon the patentee. Today, we reach the
same conclusion .... ).
93. ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 89. See U.S. Philips Corp., 861 F.2d at 703
(quoting United States v. Ginnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)).
94. Without rendering judgment, examples of potentially anticompetitive behaviors
on the part of the agricultural innovators are discussed throughout this Article. Monsanto
revolutionized the industry and caused significant structural change in the distribution of
seed. It seems fitting, therefore, to use Monsanto as an example. First, Monsanto requires
farmers to license patents on corn, soybeans, cotton, sugar beets, and canola, even if the
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In deciding cases on the unauthorized use of protected seed, courts
continually reference both the patented biotechnology and the licensee-
often simultaneously addressing questions of patent infringement and
breach of contract.95 What is missing in the analysis is the fundamental
question of whether agricultural innovators are seeking to enforce their pat-
ent rights or engage in monopolistic behavior.96 If the latter is true, it makes
no difference whether the seeds are patentable or not; the protection of a
patent is not sufficient to protect agricultural innovators if their behavior is
depriving the farmers of their right to a market in which distributors and
farmers can make their decisions about acquiring, planting, and distributing
seed free from any unreasonable restraints of trade.97 The private ordering
farmer plans to grown only cotton. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. Second, in
the last twenty years, the cost of soybean seed has more than tripled, while the number of
choices on the market has dwindled and Monsanto's market share has risen by some esti-
mates from 15% to over 90%. See, e.g., Am. Seed Co. v. Monsanto Co., 238 F.R.D. 394,
395 (D. Del. 2006) ("Plaintiffs allege that defendants, through the use of financial incentives
and bundled rebate programs, have driven competing biotechnology corn seed out of the
market, enabling defendants to charge monopoly prices to farmers and retailers."); Monsanto
Co. v. McFarling, No. 4:00CV84 CDP, 2005 WL 1490051, at *4 (E.D. Mo. June 23, 2005)
("In 1997 experts estimated that only about 15% of soybeans then being planted in the
United States used the genetically modified seeds. By the time of the 2005 trial, the number
had risen to well over 90%." Third, in order to qualify as a Monsanto seed distributor, a
business must "agree[] to limit ... sales of genetically engineered seed purchased from any
other company."). CHARLES, supra note 34, at 178. See also Pullen Seeds & Soil v. Mon-
santo Co., Nos. 06-599-SLR & 06-600-SLR, 2007 WL 2071752, at *1-2 (D. Del. July 18,
2007) ("Of the specific conduct alleged to be anticompetitive, plaintiffs assert that Monsanto
was able to maintain its monopoly profits by pursuing 'a systematic licensing and marketing
strategy that leveraged its monopoly power in the seed trait markets (including but not lim-
ited to glyphosate-tolerant seed trait market) to (a) coerce and/or pressure dealers and dis-
tributors to substantially restrict the amount of generic glyphosate herbicides they carried and
sold to growers and (b) require growers that wished to plant seeds that contained Monsanto's
biotechnology traits to use Roundup herbicide virtually exclusively rather than a competi-
tor's generic equivalent herbicide product.").
95. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("Monsanto
filed suit in the Eastern District of Missouri, charging patent infringement and breach of
contract, and seeking a preliminary injunction.").
96. Courts have held that the technology license in and of itself is not anticompeti-
tive because it does not exceed "the boundaries of [the] patent grant." Monsanto Co. v.
McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004). This fails to address the more important
question of whether the overall scheme exists to promote the patent rights of agricultural
innovators or to unduly restrict trade.
97. McIntosh v. Monsanto Co., 462 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1030 (E.D. Mo. 2006)
("Monsanto asserts that, as the owner of the patent for the '35S' promoter, it 'had the right to
either not license this gene to AgroEvo [sic] at all, or to license it on whatever terms it
deemed reasonable, including limiting the amount of Liberty Link soybeans AgrEvo could
use the gene to make.' This argument is insufficient to demonstrate that Monsanto is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law because patent holders can, under certain circumstances, be
liable for antitrust violations in connection with the scope of licensing agreements. There-
fore, Monsanto's argument that its conduct is exempt from antitrust liability merely because
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system used to distribute seed existed before the United States Supreme
Court decided J.E.M98 Agricultural innovators, be they patentees or not,
may choose to not license their goods-but they may not choose to do so in
an anticompetitive manner.
CONCLUSION
What if J.E.M v. Pioneer Hi-bred had not held that seed was pat-
entable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101? Would farmers be able to
save seed? Would genetically modified seed cease to exist? What if devel-
opers had to rely on other means of protection-would things be any differ-
ent? The answer to these questions is no.
Publicly legislated protection for agricultural innovation has increased,
and innovation has also occurred, but there is no one-to-one correlation be-
tween the two. Rather, the innovation has been impacted by the conver-
gence of numerous legal and commercial developments, including: the ex-
pansion of patent protection for the tools used in development of new seed;
the expansion of a private ordering system used to distribute the seed; the
expansion of our understanding of the technology found in the seed; the
shrinking number of players in the seed industry; 99 the shrinking varieties of
seed planted; and the decreasing number of alternatives to genetically modi-
fied seed. This perfect storm has led to an increase in profitability of
seed."° Patents have clearly impacted the development of new varieties of
seed-without patents it is doubtful that much of the genetic engineering
would have occurred at the pace it did.
it owns the '35S' promoter patent does not necessarily demonstrate that it is entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law.") (internal citations omitted).
98. J.E.M. Ag Supply Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 124 (2001).
99. Interestingly enough,
as the seed industry became more concentrated during the 1990s, private research
intensity in biotech maize, cotton and soybeans dropped or slowed down. Accord-
ing to [a] USDA report "those companies that survived seed industry consolidation
appear to be sponsoring less research relative to the size of their individual markets
than when more companies were involved."
Mascarenhas & Busch, supra note 17, at 133-34.
100. Id. at 130-31 ("[I]n 1975 a bushel of soybean seed cost $7.34. Twenty years
later, in 1994, it was $12.21. However, in 1997, one year after the introduction of Roundup
Ready® soybeans, the price of soybean seed jumped to $17.40 and six years later, in 2003,
sold for $24.20 per bushel. This is not to say that farmers who adopted Roundup Ready®
seed necessarily lost money; in addition to saving time and labour, Roundup Ready® tech-
nology reduced the need for the conventional herbicides otherwise used with non-GM farm-
ing practices. However, that said, Monsanto's monopoly on the germplasm used in Roundup
Ready® seed and near monopoly on glyphosphate gave them considerable discretion with
respect to licensing and pricing. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that farmers could abandon
the new seed-herbicide system now without suffering significant losses." (footnote and
internal citation omitted)).
Michigan State Law Review
However, the patentability of seed has not resulted in an increase in
innovation. Seed companies have circumvented public legislation and re-
lied instead on private legislation to protect their interests. They guard their
market reputation with zeal; they cloak their annual research tweaking seeds
with trade secret protection; they govern their commercialization of the seed
through contracts controlling the use of the seed line, the distribution of the
seed, and even the planting and growing of the seed; and in the end, corpo-
rate interest in developing new plant varieties is limited by corporate inter-
est in its bottom line-and that bottom line is better protected by private
regulation. Plants are expensive to develop, expensive to market, and cheap
to replicate. Corporations have turned to private ordering to fully protect
their interests, and it is private ordering that has led, in part, to the tremen-
dous advances in the development of new seed varieties.
There has been a dramatic increase in private investment in agricul-
tural research, based on the realization that contracts can be used to essen-
tially monopolize the market.'"' Furthermore, the profitability of the seed
market has led to the "acquisition of major seed companies by agricultural
chemical firms" and has "reduced the number of independent seed compa-
nies, while simultaneously substantially increasing capital investment for
plant breeding and biotechnology research." 2 All of this has occurred ab-
sent judicial recognition that seeds are patentable subject matter-so what if
seeds weren't patentable? Innovation, investment, and institutional change
occurred absent such protection, and the use of private ordering has proven
far more effective in promotion of the seed industry than the United States
Supreme Court and public ordering have.
101. Id. ("[P]rivate investment in agricultural research tripled in real terms between
1960 and 1992.").
102. Id.; see KLOPPENBURG, JR., supra note 39, at 16 ("Since 1970, an astonishing
wave of mergers and acquisitions has swept virtually every American seed company of any
size or significance into the corporate folds of the world's industrial elite. Many of these
acquisitions have been made by transnational petrochemical and pharmaceutical firms with
substantial agrichemical interests and strong commitments to the commercialization of bio-
technology in a variety of sectors. The seedsmen of today are the Monsantos, Pfizers, Up-
johns, Ciba-Geigys, Shells, and ARCOs of the world.").
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